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Hasty Decisions, and Inexpert Judgments that
Begs for a Happy Ending
Joan MacLeod Heminway'
E VEN promising small businesses have trouble finding friends-and-family,seed, angel, and venture capital in sufficient quantities to allow them to
succeed and thrive. By 2011, a number of small businesses had been successful
in raising donated funds and other funding by taking their capital appeals to
the Internet.2 Instead of asking interested people to "like" their Facebook page,
"follow" them on Twitter, or accept an invitation to "connect" on LinkedIn
(i.e., "link in"with them), entrepreneurs' had begun to ask people to like, follow,
and connect with them by funding a project or business through appeals made
over the Internet using social networking and e-commerce based technologies.4
Crowdfiunding was born and began to get traction as a business financing
option.
Legally, entrepreneurs could not offer or sell a profit-sharing or
revenue-sharing interest in the project or business for which they sought
funding unless the offering was registered under the Securities Act of 1933, as
amended (the "1933 Act").s Instruments embodying that type of interest are
typically deemed to be securities under federal or state law (or both).6 The offer
or sale of a security requires registration with federal or state authorities unless
I W.P. Toms Distinguished Professor of Law, The University of Tennessee College of Law.
New York University School of LawJ.D. 1985; Brown University, A.B. 1982.
2 See Suw Charman-Anderson, Crowdfunding Raised si.5bn in 2or, Set to Double in 20.2,
FORBES (May n1, 2012, 11:20 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/suwcharmananderson/20I2/05/z/
crowdfunding-raised-i-5bn-in-2on-set-to-double-in-2012/; Joachim Hemer, A Snapshot on
Crowdfunding 22 (Fraunhofer Inst. for Sys. & Innovation Research ISI, Working Papers Firms &
Region No. R2/201, 2on1), available at http://www.isi.fraunhofer.de/isi-media/docs/p/de/arbpap-
unternehmenregion/apr2_2on.pdf.
3 The term "entrepreneur" is used here broadly to refer to those seeking funding for a business
or product.
4 See, e.g., SHERWOOD NEISS ET AL., CROWDFUND INVESTING FOR DUMMIES 30-31 (2013)
(outlining attributes of the internet and social media environment in which crowdfund investing
originated and evolved); THOMAS ELLIOTT YOUNG, THE EVERYTHING GUIDE TO CROWDFUNDING
I03-18 (2013) (describing social media and e-commerce applications for potential use in
crowdfunding).
5 SeeJoan MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceedat YourPeril: Crowdfunding
and the Securities Act of1933,78 TENN. L. REV. 879, 906-07, 911-21 (2011) (explaining the registration
and exemption provisions of the 1933 Act in context).
6 See id. at 885-906 (describing and explaining the definition of a security under the 1933 Act
and applying it to crowdfunding).
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an exemption is available.' 'Then-existing exemptions under federal and state
law did not permit broad-based solicitations of investors over the Internet.'
Despite the success of some entrepreneurs in raising funds over the
Internet through crowdfunding that avoided the sale of securities, a number
of entrepreneurs desired to offer funders some pecuniary benefit-some
financial "skin in the game." Specifically, they wanted to be able to offer and
sell equity, interest-bearing debt instruments, and other profit-sharing or
revenue-sharing instruments to the Internet crowd.' Momentum began to
build for a federal exemption from 1933 Act registration for crowdfunded
securities. President Obama indicated his encouragement for a solution in the
fall of 2011 by including crowdfunding support in the American Jobs Act10
and backing the original investment crowdfunding bill filed in the U.S. House
of Representatives soon afterward." Lobbying from various quarters became
more and more intense, and coalitions were formed to push the initiative
forward.' 2 By the spring of 2012, the clamoring for investment crowdfinding
(also known as securities crowdfunding and crowdfund investing) reached a
veritable crescendo.'" With the President out in front of the issue and diffuse
bipartisan support, Congress no doubt believed it had to act-and, thus, it did
act. Both Houses passed the Capital Raising Online While Deterring Fraud
and Unethical Non-Disclosure Act (the "CROWDFUND Act") as Title III
of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act ("JOBS Act") 14 in March 2012,"
7 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012).
8 See C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM. Bus. L.
REV. 1,44-48; Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 5, at 916,92o-21; Brook Knight et al.,A Very Quiet
Revolution: A Primer on Securities Crowdfunding and Title III of the jobs Act, 2 MIcH. J. PRIVATE
EQuIrY & VENTURE CAP. L. 135,135 (2012) ("Until the recent passing of the Jumpstart Our Business
Startups Act ... , however, there was no legal way for businesses to tap this network to offer a
financial interest (either as debt or equity) to the public without registering the offering with the
Securities and Exchange Commission ...
9 See NEISS ET AL., supra note 4, at 34-35-
so See Press Release, Office of the White House Press Sec'y, Fact Sheet: The American Jobs
Act (Sept. 8, 2on1), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2On/09/o8/fact-
sheet-american-jobs-act.
in See Executive Office of the President, Statement of Administration Policy (Nov. 2,
20n1), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/sap/112/
saphr293 or zoInIIoz.pdf ("The Administration supports House passage of H.R. 2930.").
12 See NEISS AT AL., supra note 4, at 37-38.
13 See, e.g., Sarah Lai Stirland, Lobbying 2.0: Crowdfunding Act Buoyed by the Enthusiasm ofthe
Crowds, TECHPRESIDENT (Mar. 14,2012), http://techpresident.com/news/219o7/lobbying-20-
crowdfunding-act-buoyed-enthusiasm-crowds (describing the lobbying effort).
14 Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. II2-Io6, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
This Article uses the acronym "CROWDFUND"for Title III of the JOBS Act, after the short
title given to this Title by Congress: Capital Raising Online While Deterring Fraud and Unethical
Non-Disclosure Act. Title III of the JOBS Act can be found at Pub. L. No. iiz-io6, §§ 301-305,
126 Stat. 306,315-23 (2012) [hereinafter CROVVDFUND Act].
15 Ed O'Keefe, House Passes JOBS Act, Sends Bill to Obama, WASH. PosT (Mar. 27, 2012, 3:10
PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/2chambers/post/house-passes-jobs-act-sends-bill-
866 [Vol. 102
2013- 20141 CONGRESS KILLED INVESTMENT CROWDFUNDING 867
which the President signed into law in the first week of April.16 The U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") was compelled to promulgate
enabling regulation to effectuate the CROWDFUND Act;17 the lobbyists
engaged in back-slapping-accompanied by attaboys and hazzahs-and
took visible credit;" and from all public appearances, the future of investment
crowdfunding looked rosy. The honeymoon period was not, however, uniformly
experienced, and in any event, it did not last long.
The SEC's rulemaking was slow in coming, missing the target date set
in the CROWDFUND Act." During this period of delay, commentators
routinely denounced the postponement and expressed fear that the SEC's
rulemaking would unduly limit investment crowdfunding.20 Yet, as this Article
demonstrates, it is principally the U.S. Congress that has limited the capacity
of the CROWDFUND Act to foster capital formation for small businesses
through investment crowdfunding. 21 The provisions of the CROWDFUND
Act, as enacted by Congress, create a significant cost structure that is not likely
to be outweighed by the benefits of a crowdfunded offering conducted under
the Act; some commentators have realized this and reported it correctly.22
to-obama/20z2/0 3/27/gIQA9DfZeS-blog.html (reporting final congressional action on the JOBS
Act).
16 E.g., Mark Landler, Obama Signs Bill to Promote Start-Up Investments, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
5, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2oI2/o4/o6/us/politics/obama-signs-bill-to-ease-investing-in-
start-ups.html (reporting the signing of the JOBS Act into law).
17 Each section of the CROWDFUND Act other than the section giving the law its "short
title"mandates SEC action. See §§ 302-305-
18 See NEISS ET AL., supra note 4, at 37-38; Sherwood Neiss et al., How 3 Guys Legalized
Crowdfunding in 460 Days, STARTUP EXEMPTION (May 21, 2012), http://www.startupexemption.
com/archives/3oo.
19 §§ 302(c),30 3 (b),304(a)(2) (calling for SEC rulemaking to be completed by"270 days after
the date of enactment of this Act").
20 See, e.g., Chance Barnett, Will the S.E.C. Kill Crowdfunding?, FORBES (Feb. 19, 2013, 1:17
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett/20z3/02/I9/will-the-s-e-c-kill-crowdfunding/;
Scott Peterson,Equity Crowdfunding: WilltheSECandFINRAKillltin its Cradle?, RELAY STATION
SOCIAL MEDIA (Dec. 13, 2012), http://www.relaystationmedia.com/2o2/i2/equitycrowdfunding-
investments-will-the-sec-and-finra-kill-it-in-its-cradle/.
21 See Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., 7he New Regulation of Small Business Capital Formation: The
Impact-IfAny-OftheJOBSAct, 102 Ky. L.J. 8, 832 (2014) ("It was ... clear from the beginning that
the mandatory provisions of the Act itself may make it difficult for the Commission to construct
an efficient regulatory crowdfinding regime for small businesses in search of external capital.");
Christine Hurt, Pricing Disintermediation: Crowdfunding and Online Auction IPOs 37 (March 7,
2014) (Illinois Program in Law, Behavior and Social Science Paper No. LBSS14-27), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2406205 (noting the heavy regulatory burdens imposed through the U.S.
Congress's articulation of the crowdfunding registration exemption in the CROWDFUND Act
and describing the exemption as "a bucket of cold water on fantasies of a brave, new world of
crowdfunding.").
22 See, e.g., Hurt, supra note 21, at 38-39 ("As expected, the regulations did little to alleviate the
restrictions of the CROWDFUND Act, though the SEC was pressured to do so by many commentators.
The end result is that the regulations do very little to alter the arguably unworkable regime outlined
by Congress."); William Carleton, TheJOBSAct: Three Things Broken in Investment Crowdfunding That
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Interestingly, however, the SEC-not Congress-frequently is blamed for the
defects in the CROWDFUND Act, for which it bears no responsibility.23 In
order to remedy this cost-benefit imbalance, the SEC would have to effectively
unravel the work of Congress, a task that it is unlikely to take on.2 4
So much promise; but so little hope that it has been or will be realized.
This statement of regret, which follows logically from the brief history of the
SEC Regulations Won't Fix, VC EXPERTS, https://vcexperts.com/buzz-articles/1305 (last visited
Apr. 6, 2054) (arguing that there are three fundamental problems with the JOBS Act that cannot
be corrected by SEC regulation); Alexander Davie, In Spite of What You May Have Heard, the
Senate just Effectively Killed Crowdfunding, STRICTLY Bus. L. BLOG (Mar. 25, 2012), http://www.
strictlybusinesslawblog.com/2O2/03/25/in-spite-of-what-you-may-heave-heard-the-senate-
just-effectively-killed-crowd-crowdfunding/ (identifying specific amendments added by the
Senate to theJOBS Act that will prevent effective crowdfiinding); AnnMarie Mclwain &Donald
Murray, Is Crowdfunding to Be Crowdless?, THE HILL (May 13, 2053, 8:30 PM), http://thehill.com/
blogs/congress-blog/economy-a-budget/299341-is-crowdfinding-to-be-crowdless (arguing that
the high costs of crowdfunding under the JOBS Act will be prohibitive); Charles Wilbanks, For
Crowdfunding, the Revolution Will Be Localized, CBS NEWS (July 12, 2013, 4:35 PM), http://www.
cbsnews.com/news/for-crowdfunding-the-revolution-will-be-localized/ (quoting this author
and identifying hurdles created by the JOBS Act for entrepreneurs engaging in crowdfunding).
23 For example, the title of a recent web blog post attributes the cost of investment
crowdfunding to the SEC's rules (although the article itself merely cites to the cost-benefit analysis
in the SEC proposal release). Sherwood Neiss, It Might Cost You s3y9Kto CrowdfundstooK Under
the SEC's New Rules, VENTUREBEAT (Jan. 2, 2014, 2:14 PM), http://venturebeat.com/2o4/o1o2/it-
might-cost-you-39k-to-crowdfund-iook-under-the-secs-new-rules/. A Twitter user linked to
the article in a tweet that read "The SEC is about to ruin crowdfinding." Radley Balko, TWITTER
(Jan. 3, 204, 8:12 AM), https://twitter.com/radleybalko/status/4 i9 139 i9 43 26224 896. But others,
including members of Congress, also seem confused about the origins of the various restrictions on
participants and offerings included in the CROWDFUND Act (at least if one.believes journalist
and industry reports). See, e.g., Ted Knutson, Crowd-funding Poses 'Signficant Liability' for FAs,
Expert Warns, FIN. ADVISOR (Jan. s6, 204), http://wwwfa-mag.com/news/crowd-funding-
poses-significant-liability-for-fas--expert-warns-166 5o.html (citing to and quoting from
comments made regarding the SEC rule making by a member of the House of Representatives).
24 See Hurt, supra note 21, at 37 ("The statute did leave some of the details to the SEC to flesh
out in regulations; however, the SEC could only tighten the detailed statute with more requirements,
not fewer."); id. at 38 ("Because Congress made the CROWDFUND Act so detailed, the SEC had
very little leeway to subtract, and not much to add, to flesh out the new provisions in the Securities
Act."). Congress has afforded the SEC relatively broad rulemaking authority under the federal
securities laws. See Securities Act of 1933,15 U.S.C. §§ 77s, 78mm (2012). Yet, even if this authority
could be used to contravene the requirements imposed by Congress in the CROWDFUND Act
(which is uncertain, at best), the SEC would not likely use its authority to overwrite congressional
actions in the current political and fiscal environment, especially because these congressional
undertakings resulted in over ten years of heavy burdens on rulemaking and underfunding.
See, e.g., Joan MacLeod Heminway, Sustaining Reform Efforts at the SEC: A Progress Report, 30
BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POLY REP. I, II-I2 (Apr. 2011) (noting friction between Congress and
the SEC regarding funding); William Alden, For 2 Wall Street Regulators, More Belt-Tightening,
N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Jan. 14, 2014, 5:13 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.comi/o 4 /oi/I 4 /for-2-
wall-street-regulators-more-belt-tightening/ (describing Congress' proposed budget cuts for the
SEC); Timothy Spangler, SEC to Congress: "Show Us the Money", FORBES (Jan. 23, 20T, 6:41 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/timothyspangler/2011/ou/23/sec-to-congress-show-us-the-money/
(illustrating Congress'limitations on funding for the SEC).
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investment crowdfunding movement, captures a dominant theme in the current
investment crowdfunding narrative among a growing group of commentators.
The democratization of capital formation promised by the CRO'WDFUND
Act is highly improbable regardless of the nature and extent of final rulemaking
by the SEC and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA").
This Article, which builds on earlier work by Professors C. Steven Bradford25
and Stuart Cohn,2 6 explains the history and current status of the regulation
of crowdfunding under the 1933 Act, identifies and describes reasons for
despair about the current regulatory environment, and suggests a way forward.
The way forward assumes, without further analysis, that the CROWDFUND
Act demonstrates the inevitability-even if not the desirability-of a viable
1933 Act registration exemption for crowdfunding.
I. How WE GOT TO WHERE WE ARE
The story of investment crowdfuinding over the past few years is a classic
regulatory tale. It includes economic elements and political elements. Truly, it
is a story of political economy, broadly writ. Ihis Part unpacks this history to
enable a better understanding of where investment crowdfunding has been, is,
and may be.
A. How Is Investment Crowdfunding Regulated
Under the CROWDFUND Act?
The CROWDFUND Act amends both the 1933 Act and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended ("1934 Act"). Among other things,
the CROWDFUND Act permits unregistered public offers and sales of
securities made under specified conditions by creating a new exemption
from 1933 Act registration (the "crowdfunding exemption"). 7 Further, the
CROWDFUND Act excludes investors purchasing securities in an offering
that qualifies for the crowdfunding exemption from the calculation of equity
holders for purposes of determining the applicability of the registration
requirements of the 1934 Act.28 Although Congress employed traditional
tools of securities regulation in composing the CROWI)FUND Act
(i.e., mandatory disclosure rules, antifraud and other liability provisions, and
substantive regulation of participants and conduct), the legislative process was
25 See C. Steven Bradford, 7e New Federal Crowdfunding Exemption: Promise Unfulfiled, 40
SEc. REG. L.J. 195 (2012).
26 See Stuart R. Cohn, The New Crowdfunding Registration Exemption. Good Idea, Bad
Execution, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1433 (2012), available at http://scholarship.1aw.ufl.edu/cgilviewcontent.
cgi?article=bo32&context=fir.
27 JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-Io6, § 302(a), 126 Stat. 306,315 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77 d(a)
(6) (2012)).
28 Id. § 303(a) (codified at 15 US.C. § 781(g)(6)).
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politically driven and not well considered, resulting in a veritable "piling on" of
costly investor protection devices and market integrity safeguards.29 As a result,
the provisions of the CROWDFUND Act represent a bit of a hodgepodge-a
messy accumulation of enabling and protective provisions.
This Article focuses specifically on these provisions-the 1933 Act
crowdfunding exemption and related legislative enactments in the 1933 Act
and the 1934 Act. The CROWDFUND Act's new registration exemption for
crowdfunded offerings is codified in Section 4(a)(6) of the 1933 Act." The
exemption is for primary offerings only-offerings by an issuer of securities to
investors. To comply with the exemption, an offering must meet a number of
requirements.
Specifically, to be exempt from registration under the CROWDFUND Act,
both the offering of securities and the purchases made by investors in that
offering are limited in dollar amount. Under Section 4(a)(6), issuers may sell
no more than $1,000,000 in any twelve-month period in reliance on the
crowdfunding exemption."' In addition, those purchasing securities in offerings
under the crowdfunding exemption are limited in the amount they can invest
in any twelve-month period to:
(i) the greater of $2,000 or 5 percent of the annual income or net worth of
such investor, as applicable, ifeither the annual income or the net worth of
the investor is less than $100,000; and
(ii) 10 percent of the annual income or net worth of such investor, as
applicable, not to exceed a maximum aggregate amount sold of $100,000,
if either the annual income or net worth of the investor is equal to or more
than $100,000 .... 2
Accordingly, CROWDFUND Act offerings are likely to be conducted by
small businesses or for small projects and may involve many purchasers making
small dollar-value investments.
The CROVVDFUND also regulates the process of conducting an exempt
crowdfunded securities offering. Specifically, all CROWDFUND Act offerings
must be conducted through a registered intermediary-either a broker
(a pre-existing transactional intermediary recognized and regulated under
federal and state securities law) or a funding portal (a new transactional
intermediary created by the CROWDFUND Act). This intermediation
29 See, e.g.,John Wasik, Crowdfunding Rules: Hurry Up and Wait, FORBES (June 27, 2012, 3:31
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnwasik/20z2/o6/27/crowdfunding-not-kosher-yet/ ("[C]
autious senators injected more investor protection language in the final version of the legislation
that could make rulemaking nettlesome.").
30 Securities Act of 1933,15 U.S.C. § 7 7d(a)(6) (2012).
31 Id. § 77 d(a)(6)(A).
32 Id § 7 7d(a)(6)(B) (leaving unclear the investment cap if, for example, an investor's annual
income is below the threshold amount and net worth is above the threshold amount).
33 Id § 7 7d(a)(6)(C); see also Cohn, supra note 26, at 1439-4o.
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requirement, like the per-investor cap, was introduced to the legislation as an
investor protection element.'
Issuers desiring to avail themselves of the crowdfunding registration
exemption in the CROWDFUND Act must comply with a list of
requirements that includes mandatory disclosures (defined in the statute by
reference to eight broad subject-matter categories), limitations on advertising
and promoter compensation, and periodic reporting.3 s The SEC may add to
this list of mandates. 6 It has taken advantage of this invitation (and expressly
indicates that it is doing so) in a number of areas in its proposal release." Even
without SEC enhancement, however, Congress's articulation of disclosure
requirements as set forth in the CROWDFUND Act is relatively precise in
certain respects, explicitly calling for the issuer to "file with the Commission
and provide to investors and the relevant broker or funding portal, and make
available to potential investors" specific information about the issuer, its business
operations, its management and security holders, its financial affairs, and its
capital structure, and information about the offering and the use of the offering
proceeds."'Ihe specific legislatively mandated disclosures on financial matters
include, for example, making available "financial statements reviewed by a
public accountant who is independent of the issuer, using professional standards
and procedures for such review or standards and procedures established by the
Commission, by rule, for such purpose" for offerings over $100,000 but not over
$500,000 in aggregate amount" and audited financial statements for offerings
over $500,000 up to the $1,000,000 cap.40
Each broker or funding portal acting as an intermediary under the
CROWDFUND Act also must comply with certain requirements in order
for an offering to qualify for the crowdfunding exemption. 41 For example, the
statute requires an intermediary to register with the SEC and the applicable
34 See Cohn, supra note 26, at 1439 (2013).
35 15 U.S.C. § 77 d-(b)(i)-( 4 ) (2012); see also Bradford, supra note 25, at 202-05; Cohn, supra
note 26, at 1441-43.
36 15 U.S.C. § 7 7d-i(b) 5); see also Campbell, supra note 21.
37 See, e.g., Crowdfiunding, Securities Act Release No. 9470, Exchange Act Release No.
70741, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, at 173, 391 (requiring an intermediary to provide investor-to-investor
and investor-to-issuer communication channels on its platform, subject to certain conditions)
(proposed Oct. 23, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/203/33-947o.pdf; see also
Campbell, supra note 21, at 833-36 (noting and criticizing mandatory disclosure provisions required
by the SEC). These augmentations appear to be driven, at least to some extent, by common sense
or other mandates within and features of the CROWDFUND Act (including, e.g., risk reduction
requirements imposed on intermediaries and the misstatements and omissions liability imposed on
principals of the business). See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
38 Id. § 77d-i(b)(i).
39 Id. § 77 d-(b)(i)(D)(ii).
40 Id § 77 d-(b)(i)(D)(iii).
41 See generally Cohn, supra note 26, at i44o-4i (describing the requirements and obligations
of intermediaries under the CROWDFUND Act).
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self-regulatory organization (i.e., FINRA), and to make certain disclosures
of its own (including disclosures of risk-related and investor education
information). 42 Funding portals are subject to additional strictures.43 Specifically,
they cannot "offer investment advice or recommendations,"' "solicit purchases,
sales, or offers to buy the securities offered or displayed on its website or portal,"45
"compensate employees, agents, or other persons for such solicitation or based
on the sale of securities displayed or referenced on its website or portal," 46 "hold,
manage, possess, or otherwise handle investor funds or securities," 47 or "engage
in such other activities as the Commission, by rule, determines appropriate."48
The CROWDFUND Act also makes all brokers and finding portals acting
as crowdfunding intermediaries responsible for a variety of tasks, including
(among others):
* guaranteeing that each investor "reviews investor-education
information;"49
* affirming each investor's understanding that he, she, or it "is
risking the loss of the entire investment, and that the investor
could bear such a loss;""
* ensuring that each investor answers questions
demonstrating-
(i) "an understanding of the level of risk generally
applicable to investments in startups, emerging
businesses, and small issuers;""
(ii) "an understanding of the risk of illiquidity; and"52
(iii) "an understanding of such other matters as the
Commission determines appropriate, by rule;"5 3
42 15 U.S.C. § 77d-I(a)(i)-( 3).
43 See generally Bradford, supra note 25, at 220-22 (summarizing and critiquing restrictions on
finding portals).
44 15 U.S.C. § 7 8c(a)(8o)(A) (2012).
45 Id § 78c(a)(8o)(B).
46 Id. § 7 8c(a)(8o)(C).
47 Id. § 78c(a)(8o)(D).
48 Id. § 78c(a)(80)(E).
49 15 U.S.C. § 77d-I(a)(4)(A) (202).
50 Id. § 77 d-i(a)(4)(B).
51 Id § 77d-I(a)(4 )(C)(i).
52 Id § 7 7d-I(a)(4 )(C)(ii).
53 Id § 77 d-I(a)(4)(C)(iii).
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* taking fraud risk reduction measures, "including obtaining
a background and securities enforcement regulatory history
check on each officer, director, and person holding more than
20 percent of the outstanding equity of every issuer whose
securities are offered by such person;"54
* affording the SEC and potential investors access, within 21
days after "the first day on which securities are sold to an
investor," to information provided by the issuer under the
provisions of the CROWDFUND Act described above;ss
* overseeing the retention and distribution of the offering
proceeds to ensure that they are not released to the issuer until
"the aggregate capital raised from all investors" satisfies the
target offering amount established by the issuer, and allowing
investors to withdraw their commitments to invest;s6
* acting to ensure compliance with the twelve-month
investment limits for issuers described above;"
* helping to protect the privacy of investor information;ss
* not compensating "promoters, finders, or lead generators for
providing the broker or funding portal with the personal
identifying information of any potential investor";,
* prohibiting its management from having a financial interest
in an issuer that has retained its services;6 and
* complying with other requirements prescribed by the SEC.61
Congress supported these offering requirements for issuers and
intermediaries with a new misstatements and omissions liability provision
54 Id. § 77 d-s(a)(5)-
55 Id § 77 d-I(a)(6).
56 Id § 77d-I(a)(7).
57 Id § 7 7d-I(a)(8).
58 Id § 77d-I(a)(9).
59 Id § 77 d-I(a)(io).
6o Id § 77 d-i(a)(ui).
61 Id § 77d-i(a)(12). In fact, many of the other requirements imposed on issuers and
intermediaries under the CROWDFUND Act also are expressly qualified because the Act
specifically designates the SEC's ability or obligation to make further provisions. See, e.g., id.
§ 7 7d-I(a)(3)-(9), (b)(r)(I), (b)(3)-(4).
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modeled on and, in the crowdfunded offering context, analogous to the
pre-existing misstatements and omissions liability provision found in Section
12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act.62 Under this new liability provision, a purchaser of
securities in an offering subject to the crowdfunding exemption may bring
a legal action against the issuer of the offered securities for any written or
oral communication made by the issuer that includes an untrue statement of
material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary to make statements
made in the communication not misleading.63 The purchaser may not recover
if he, she, or it knew of the untruth or omission." An issuer has the burden of
proving it "did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have
known, of such untruth or omission."6 s
In October 2013, the SEC released its proposed rules under the
CROWDFUND Act.66 Some public commentators cried out "Hallelujah!"
and expressed the view that investment crowdfunding was finally on its way
to becoming a reality.67 Most were more subdued in their responses, and an
increasing number of commentators began to acknowledge that the SEC had
principally followed Congress's directives in its rulemaking and, for the most
part, declined Congress's invitation to add significant burdens to those already
created under the CROWDFUND Act.68 One observer poignantly offered:
"'Ihere's nothing the SEC can do to make non-accredited crowdfunding under
Title III of the JOBS Act cost-efficient.The essential problem is that Congress
wrote a mini-registration law, rather than authorizing the agency to craft a
crowdfunding exemption."" However, many overtly or implicitly blamed the
62 Securities Act of 1933,15 U.S.C. § 77/(a)(2) (2012).
63 See § 7 7d-I(c)(I)-(2)(A).
64 Id. § 77 d-I(c)(2)(A).
65 Id § 7 7d-I(c)(2)(B).
66 Crowdfinding, Securities Act Release No. 9470, Exchange Act Release No. 70741, 78 Fed.
Reg. 66,428 (proposed Oct. 23, 203), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2013/33-9470.
pdf.
67 See, e.g., Devin Thorpe, Where Does Crowdfunding Go from Here? Experts Explain, FORBES
(Feb. 1, 2014, 7:37 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/devinthorpe/20z4/02/or/where-does-
crowdfunding-go-from-here-experts-explain/ ("Crowdfunding is going mainstream.").
68 See, e.g., Ashley Adelman, SEC's Crowdfunding Rules Open for Public Comment, AccESS TO
CAPITAL (Dec. n, 2013), http://accesstocapital.com/secs-crowdfunding-rules-open-for-public-
comment/ (noting that "the proposed rules are almost identical to the JOBS Act"); Gabrielle
Karol, SEC's New Crowdfunding Rules Explained, FOX SMALL BusINEss CENTER (Oct. 24, 2013),
http://smallbusiness.foxbusiness.com/finance-accounting/203/o/24/sec-new-crowdfunding-
rules-explained/ ("McDermott, Will & Emery partner Thomas Murphy, who heads up the firm's
securities and capital markets group, says the SEC more or less stuck to the letter of the law.");
Brian Kom, SEC Proposes CrowdfundingRules,FORBEs (Oct. 23, 2013,2:41 PM), http://wwwforbes.
com/sites/deborahljacobs/20s3/1o/23/sec-proposes-crowdfunding-rules/ ("[T]he SEC's hands are
tied since the JOBS Act itself creates most of the restrictions in the proposed rule.").
69 William Carleton, 7he Fault Lies Not in Our Agencies, but in Our Congresses, WILLIAM
CARLETON, COUNs. @ L. (Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.wac6.com/wac6/2oi4/oi/the-fault-lies-
not-in-our-agencies-but-in-our-congresses.html; see also Hurt, supra note 21, at 37 ("Many
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SEC for effectively nullifying the great promise of investment crowdfunding
through over-regulation or for under-regulating to achieve investor-protection
and market-integrity objectives.7 0
The proposed SEC rules are collected under "Regulation Crowdfunding," a
new body of rules under the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act."The SEC's rulemaking
proposal is 585 pages long and, in most respects, implements and adds essential
or anticipated details to Congress's mandates in the CROWDFUND Act.72 In
fact, the SEC posits almost 300 numbered questions on which it is requesting
comments (in addition to requesting general comments and comments on its
economic analysis), many of which ask about the need for or desirability of
requirements in excess of what Congress provided. As earlier noted, there
are areas in which the SEC adds to the congressional framework provided
in the CROWDFUND Act,74 but these enhanced protections for investors
and markets are expressly noted and add minimal heft to Congress's already
weighty exemption requirements.
B. What Contributed to the Current Investment
Crowdfunding Regulatory Scheme?
As I think about the CROWDFUND Act and the SEC rulemaking
under it in the context of the greater crowdfunding phenomenon, I am
constantly reminded of the following infamous line in the Talking Heads song,
Once in a Lifetime: "[Y]ou may ask yourself-well... How did I get here?"s
The process has a bit of an existential feel to it, just like the song. Over a
five-year period, crowdfunding-including some investment
crowdfiinding-grew from individual experiments in web-based business
finance to a veritable international movement with, as is so often the case,
regulators playing catch-up with the market.
commentators who were hoping for an exemption that would provide a cheap and easy path to
crowdfunding bemoaned the cost of disclosure, particularly ongoing disclosure, as well as other
costly requirements.").
70 See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 21, at 833 ("Setting the efficient level ofmandatory disclosure
is certainly the most difficult decision for the Commission in connection with its regulatory
implementation of the Crowdfunding Act, and I fear the Commission has missed it badly in this
first iteration."); Gene Marks, Seriously Ridiculous: Rethinking the SEC's Proposed Crowdfunding
Rules, INc., http://www.inc.com/gene-marks/rethinking-sec-proposed-crowdfunding-rules.html
(last updated Nov. 7,2013) ("[T]he SEC proposal is drawing some well-deserved criticism.").
71 Crowdfunding, Securities Act Release No. 9470, Exchange Act Release No. 70741, 78 Fed.




74 See, e.g., id. at 36 (describing ways in which the proposed rules add categories of issuers
excluded from exemption eligibility).
75 TALKING HEADS, Once in aLifetime, on REMAIN IN LIGHT (Sire Records 5980).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
I first became aware of and began to follow crowdfunding in or about 2007,
when National Public Radio aired a segment on crowdfunded music albums,
which featured early crowdfunding sites SellaBand and Slicethepie.7 6 My
husband alerted me to the segment, noting that it seemed like the kind of
business model I would care about because it sounded like it could involve a
sale of securities. He was right. I immediately began looking into the business
model (then operating in Europe), and I found it provided great illustrations
for the investment contract section of the "What is a security?" part of my
Securities Regulation course. I used SellaBand and Slicethepie (with some
altered facts connecting their business to the U.S.) on my final exam for
Securities Regulation in the spring of 2008. Since that time, crowdfunding has
been a topic covered on either my midterm or final exam for that course.
In January 2010, I received an email message from someone who had
found an online video of a lecture that I gave describing my 2009 midterm
exam in Securities Regulation (my first experiment with an oral midterm
exam). My email correspondent, Josh, was an entrepreneur with a law degree
and international experience in small business finance. He was interested in
starting up a website to crowdfund social enterprises. The catch? He wanted to
be able to offer funders a small profit-sharing or revenue-sharing increment.
He eventually did found, operate, and unwind that crowdfunding business,
which was featured in my original, coauthored article on crowdfinding.n7 Over
the many months that Josh and I communicated (mostly through email), Josh
suggested a number of times that I speak and write on the topic, since no
one else who he had contacted both understood the business model and had
taken an interest in the legal aspects of the business model. This interchange
encouraged my continuing research on crowdfunding (crowdfund investing in
particular), eventually led to my written work in this area, and frames my view
of investment crowdfunding and the CROWDFUND Act.
What I learned from Josh and from my research built on my general
legal, academic, and practical knowledge of corporate finance and
securities regulation. There was (and is) a significant funding gap for small
private business ventures-especially startups-that is not being filled by
friends-and-family, seed, angel, and venture capital." There also was (and is)
76 See generally Eliot Van Buskirk, Put Your Money Where Your Indie Rock Is, WIRED (Mar.
3, 2oo8), http://www.wired.com/entertainment/music/commentary/listeningpost/2oo8/o3/
listeningpost_o303 (describing how music fans have turned into music investors through
crowdfunding on SellaBand and Slicethepie).
77 See Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 5, at 892 n.6o and accompanying text.
78 See generally Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior of Angel Investors, 61
VAND. L. REV. 1405, 1416-18 (2008) (describing this funding gap); Thomas G. James, Far from the
Maddening Crowd: Does the JOBS Act Provide Meaningful Redress to Small Investors for Securities
Fraud in Connection with Crowdfunding Offerings?, 4 B.C. L. REV. 1767, 1771-72 (2013) (same);
Knight et al., supra note 8, at 139 (noting that "[t]he company that needs just a few hundred
thousand dollars has faced a considerable challenge."); David Mashburn, Comment, The Anti-
Crowd Pleaser: Fixing the CrowdfundAct's Hidden Risks and Inadequate Remedies, 63 EMORY L.J. 127,
876 [ Vol. 102
2013- 20141 CONGRESS KILLED INVESTMENT CROWDFUNDING 877
some frustration among members of the general public, most of whom are
typically shut out of investing in early-stage ventures under traditional means of
financing small businesses." Crowdfunding, Internet offerings to an unlimited
audience (as originally conceived and organically grown), strives to meet both
needs-those of small business entrepreneurs and those of the general public
investment community-by offering funding opportunities for businesses or
projects over the Internet without regard to the investor's geographic location,
net worth, annual salary, or pre-existing relationship to the entrepreneurs, their
business, or their project.
Early investment crowdfunding initiatives, unregistered (and therefore
illegal) as they were and are, are part of the fabric of crowdfunding as it has
begun to develop. Histories of the crowdfunding movement and investment
crowdfunding are related in varying degrees of detail and with varying areas
of emphasis."0 Many, if not most, of these histories, however, ignore the reality
that various crowdfunding websites have been offering and selling investment
interests that are securities without registering those offerings under the
1933 Act. ProFounder, which ceased operations in early 2012, is the most
widely publicized example of this reality," but other similar websites have
existed and continue to exist.82
This unique part of the history of investment crowdfinding-the natural
emergence of a new market for securities offerings-flies under the radar for
many observers. Why? Because those observers typically do not recognize that
the interests in businesses and projects offered through these crowdfunding
websites are, in fact, securities. 'hat lack of recognition likely results from the
fact that the websites were not offering equity (stock) or debt instruments
(debentures or notes). Instead, they were offering what securities lawyers know
as "investment contracts." An investment contract is "a contract, transaction or
139-43 (2013) (same); Jeffrey E. Sohl, The US. Angel and Venture CapitalMarket: Recent Trends and
Developments, 6 J. PRIVATE EQUITY 7, 14 (2003) (same).
79 See Knight et al., supra note 8, at 139 (noting that "the ability of a person of average means to
participate as an investor in the start-up world has been almost nonexistent."). For example, because
these investors often are neither accredited investors as defined in Regulation D, see 07 C.F.R. §
230.501 (2014), nor sophisticated for purposes of offerings conducted Rule 5o6 under Regulation D,
see 17 C.F.R. § 23o.506(b)(2)(ii), they are not often solicited to participate in Regulation D offerings.
80 See, e.g., KEVIN LAWTON & DAN MAROM, THE CROWDFUNDING REVOLUTION 47-66
(2003); NEISS ET AL., supra note 4, at 23-40; YOUNG, supra note 4, at 55-56.
81 See Amy Cortese, The Future of Crowdfunding, LOCAVESTING (Feb. 23, 2012), http://
locavesting.blogspot.cOm/2oI2/o2/future-of-crowdfunding.html; Leena Rao, Fundraising
Platform for Startups ProFounder Shuts Its Doors, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 17, 2012), http://techcrunch.
com/2012/02/17/Startup-fundraising-platform-profounder-shuts-its-doors/.
82 My original coauthored crowdfunding article featured one of these firms, 33needs, which
also ceased operations before passage of the CROWDFUND Act. See Heminway & Hoffman,
supra note 5, at 892 n.6o and accompanying text; see also Anthony Ha, 3jneeds Helps Do-Gooder
Startups Crowdsource Their Funding, VENTUREBEAT (Jan. 31, 2000, 9:01 PM), http://venturebeat.
com/20H/OI/3l/33needs-launch/; Tristan Pollock,33Needs Turning Ideas into Action, NExT BILLION
(Jan. 21, 200), http://nextbillion.net/33needs.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led
to expect profits solely from the efforts of a promoter or a third party.""
Specifically, these crowdfunding websites were offering investment contracts
that I have come to call "unequity:" "a particular type of financial interest
that provides for profit-sharing or revenue-sharing on a short-term basis,
with no accompanying governance rights."84 For example, a fashion designer
might solicit funds from the crowd in $10 increments to help finance her first
collection and promise funders a share of her profits from the resulting sales of
that collection proportional to the amount of each funder's contribution. Or a
software application developer might ask the crowd for financial backing and
agree to give investors a fraction of the sales price of one or more copies of
the application in exchange for a particular amount invested. Unlike common
equity investors, these funders have no ability to choose the management of the
venture or define or change the business or operations of the venture funded;
unlike convertible preferred equity investors, these funders have no ability to
acquire an equity interest in the business or project; and, unlike redeemable
preferred equity and debt investors, these funders do not have a right to
repayment of the principal amount invested.
In fact, the typical unequity offering is not intended to (and may not) result
in pecuniary gain to the investor. Rather, the gain comes in part from financial
return and in part from other return, often in the form of a tangible reward
(i.e., a good or service) or altruism (e.g., for social enterprise investments or
for funding the little guy with the creative idea who otherwise would not be
able to execute on his idea), happiness or pride (e.g., by developing a two-way
relationship with an entrepreneur-being able to say that you contributed to
and received proceeds from a startup's business), or other emotional satisfaction.
Typically, the promoters of the businesses and projects seeking funding through
unequity are looking for small amounts of investment capital from their
crowdfunded offerings-closer to the amounts typically sought on donation
and reward crowdfunding websites like Kickstarter and Indiegogo than to the
amounts typically raised by equity crowdfunding websites in other countries."s
The CROWDFUND Act does not efficiently foster this organically grown
market for capital, which had promise to well serve startups in certain lines of
83 SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
84 Joan MacLeod Heminway, What Is a Security in the Crowdfunding Era?, 7 OHIO ST.
ENTREPREN. Bus. LJ. 335, 360-61 (2012); see also Joan MacLeod Heminway, To Be or Not to Be (a
Security): Funding For-Profit Social Enterprises, 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 299,312 n.50 (2013).
85 See CROWDSOURCING, LLC., CROWDFUNDING INDUSTRY REPORT: MARKET TRENDS,
COMPOSITION AND CROWDFUNDING PLATFORMS (ABRIDGED VERSION) (May 2012), available
at http://www.crowdfunding.nl/wp-content/uploads/2zO2/o5/9283465i-Massolution-abridged-
Crowd-Funding-Industry-Reporti.pdf (showing that most crowdfunded equity offerings raise
s5o,ooi-sioo,ooo and most donation-based or rewards-based crowdfunded offerings raise less than
s25oo); see also Kickstarter Stats, KICKSTARTER, (last visited Apr. 6, 2014), https://www.kickstarter.
com/help/stats ("Most successflflly funded projects raise less than sio,ooo, but a growing number
have reached six and even seven figures.").
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business. Enthusiasm and the desire to offer broad-based support for small
business likely drove the inclusion of $1,000,000 cap in the CROWDFUND
Act.16 Given that crowdfunded offerings were being made at that level
(although not many), it might have seemed to congressional sponsors that
a $1,000,000 cap was reasonable. Setting the cap at $1,000,000 also put the
crowdfunding registration exemption in the same, relatively unregulated
environment in which the limited offering registration exemption provided
for in Rule 504 of Regulation D under the 1933 Act" operates. To many
of us watching the crowdfunding sector, however, $1,000,000 seemed like a
high maximum aggregate offering amount to permit, given that investment
crowdfunding represents a relatively untested offering method and segment
of the capital markets." The fear that non-accredited investors would desire
to invest significant amounts of money in an offering of this size drove the
inclusion of sundry investor protection provisions in the CROWDFUND Act:
the individual investment limits, detailed statutorily ordained mandatory
disclosures, the requirement that offerings be conducted through a broker or
finding portal (and the obligations and restrictions imposed on broker and
funding portal activities), and the new misstatements liability scheme. 9
Given presidential support and bipartisan backing in Congress (after all,
who wants to oppose a bill that effectively promises to increase and broaden
the base of investment capital and, perhaps, spur entrepreneurial activity and
job creation during an economic downturn?),o there undeniably was significant
political pressure to pass the CROWDFUND Act. This environment fostered
rushed congressional decisions on the aggregate offering limit and, flowing
from that, hurried, compromise-driven determinations to add significant
burdens on issuers, intermediaries, and investors to the crowdfunding
86 In fact, the earliest version of the bill that eventually became the CROWDFUND Act
included a cap. See Entrepreneur Access to Capital Act, H.R. 2930, 112th Cong. § 2(a) (201).
87 17 C.F.R. § 230-504 (2014).
88 E.g., Cohn, supra note 26, at 1437 (noting that "registration exemptions for offerings for not
more than $250,000, or offerings up to $500,000 with investments limited, for example, to no more
than sI,oo, would have addressed many if not most crowdfinding situations").
89 See id. at 1438 ("'The problem with having selected one million dollars as the authorized
amount is that Congress then felt impelled to surround the exemption with numerous requirements
that might not have been necessary had an exemption been created for smaller offerings in lieu of
or in addition to the one million dollar exemption."); Knight et al., supra note 8, at 137 (describing
the heavy, traditional regulation in the CROWDFUND Act as "less 'Kickstarter plus' and more -
'Merrill minus."'); John S. (Jack) Wroldsen, The Social Network and the CrowdindAct: Zuckerberg
Saverin, and Venture Capitalists' Dilution of the Crowd, 1s VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 583, 598-99
(2053) (describing the political process behind the inclusion of the referenced investor protection
provisions in the CROWDFUND Act); see also supra notes 33-65 and accompanying text
(describing the referenced investor protection provisions in the CROWDFUND Act).
90 See supra notes 11-13; Jeff Howe, Senators Introduce a Bi-Partisan Crowdfunding Bill,
CROWDSOURCING.ORG (Mar. 13, 2012, 8:57 PM), http://www.crowdsourcing.org/editorial/senators-
introduce-a-bi-partisan-crowdfunding-bill/123uI.
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exemption." Unquestionably, Congress's lack of knowledge and experience in
securities regulation and corporate finance-as a broadly representative body of
individuals with varied backgrounds and loyalties-played a role in the way the
political process translated policy and concepts into the text of the final version
of the legislation.
No doubt the SEC, as the expert securities regulator in the federal
government, would have been better able to make required and desired tradeoffs
and create a more nuanced, cost-effective exemption for crowdfunded offerings.
Having said that, as many commentators have noted, the SEC struggled with
the desirability of introducing a registration exemption for crowdfunding
before and during the legislative process.92 This hostile dynamic involving the
SEC effectively forced proponents of the exemption into Congress's politically
charged, compromise-driven, non-expert environment in order to achieve their
objectives. The SEC's uneasiness about crowdfunding and its foot-dragging
in proposing rules under the CROWDFUND Act also clearly color many
observers'reactions to the SEC rulemaking process-making the SEC an easier
scapegoat for the actual and anticipated failings of the CROWDFUND Act."
II. WHY THE CROWDFUND ACT Is SUBOPTIMAL
INVESTMENT CROWDFUNDING REGULATION
Why and how does the crowdfunding exemption come up short in
achieving its objectives? In one word, the answer is: costs. The costs for small
business issuers and intermediaries that are built into the CROWDFUND Act
91 See Cohn, supra note 26, at 1434 ("Congress's rush to action resulted in a statute that appears
to have failed in its primary purpose to assist entrepreneurs And others seeking to raise small
amounts of capital through broad-based solicitation and may have made matters worse through its
heavy-handed regulatory action."). One investment crowdfunding advocate, who participated in
the legislative process that resulted in the passage of the CROVDFUND Act, noted the relative
speed with which that process moved:
We had been told that, even ifwe did get a bill submitted, it could take five to ten
years for it to move through the House and Senate to final passage and presidential
signature . . . . Our actual time between the creation of the Startup xemption
Reuatory Framework and the president's signing of the JOBS Act was 460 days.
Although 460 days feels like a lifetime to an entrepreneur, it's lightning speed in
Washington, D.C.
NEISS ET AL., supra note 4, at 37.
92 See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 21, at 832 ("It was clear from the beginning that any
regulatory implementation of the Act by the Commission would be contentious."); see also Ben
Protess, Regulator Seeks Feedback on JOBS Act, N.Y. TIMEs DEALBOOK (Apr. I, 2012, 4:T6 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2oz2/o4/li/regulator-seeks-feedback-on-jobs-act/ (quoting
negative comments from then-SEC Chairwoman Mary Schapiro); Scott Shane, SECDon'tMake
Crowdfunding Uselessfor Main Street, BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 4,20]3), http://www.businessweek.com/
articles/203-o2-o4/sec-don-t-make-crowdfunding-useless-for-main-street (noting that "the
SEC came out strongly against the crowdfunding clause in the JOBS Act, even after it was clear
that our elected officials were going to make the tool possible").
93 See, e.g., Shane, supra note 92.
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business issuers and intermediaries that are built into the CROWDFUND Act
simply are too high in comparison to the expected benefits, especially for small
aggregate offering amounts. Although exact costs are difficult to benchmark
given the untested nature of the investment crowdfunding market,94
commentators have made a number of salient general and specific assertions
about the nature or amount of the projected costs associated with compliance
with the crowdfunding exemption.
For example, Professor Steve Bradford expressed concern about the
complexity and expense of both the disclosure and liability provisions in the
crowdfunding exemption. He observed that "[t]he issuer disclosure requirements
in the new crowdfunding exemption are neither simple nor inexpensive" 5 and
that
[t]he detailed disclosure requirements in the Act, coupled with the new
liability section, are a liability trap for unwary, unsophisticated entrepreneurs.
Some issuers are bound to bungle the extensive, complicated disclosures
required by the exemption. Since the new liability section has no scienter
requirement, those issuers will be liable even if their failure to disclose
properly was merely negligent, not intentional."6
He ultimately criticized Congress for passing "a poorly drafted regulatory
bundle of old ideas that is complicated, expensive, and unlikely to have much of
an effect on the small business capital gap."" Similarly, Professor Stuart Cohn
observed that:
[i]t is difficult to imagine that for offerings under $250,000 either issuers
or intermediaries would be willing to undertake the time, cost and risk of
potential liabilities. The mandated use of intermediaries, the significant role
that intermediaries are expected to play, and the mandated disclosures all
point to an impracticable exemption for relatively small offerings....
For the entrepreneurs, artists, project managers, and others seeking to raise
relatively small amounts, the crowdfunding exemption is of limited utility.
Indeed, the new exemption may have made life more difficult for the truly
small promotions by creating an exemption that is impracticable but, having
been created with much fanfare, cannot be ignored, unlike the pre-existing
situation when crowdfunding existed to some extent beneath regulatory
concerns.
8
He concluded that "[t]he new § 4(6) exemption is an opportunity missed."9
Although Professor Rutheford Campbell finds significant fault with the
94 See Crowdfunding, Securities Act Release No. 9470, Exchange Act Release No. 70741,
78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, at 345-46 (proposed Oct. 23, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
proposed/2o13/33-9470.pdf.
95 Bradford, supra note 25, at 217.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 222.
98 Cohn, supra note 26, at 1444-45.
99 Id. at 1445; see also Hurt, supra note 21, at 44 (characterizing the outlook for investor
crowdfunding as "doubtful," noting that "proponents of crowdfunding despair over the costly
restrictions imposed on equity crowdfinding and portals."); id. at 58 ("[T]he long overdue
exemption for securities registration seems more likely to choke out quality equity crowdfunding
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SEC's rule making, he also lays some blame for the overall expense of the
CROWDFUND Act's registration exemption on Congress. 00
Industry representatives and legal experts agree with the scholarly
commentary, pointing to issuer audit and disclosure costs'o' as well as
registration and other costs imposed on intermediaries.1 02 One commentator
flatly stated that, "[c]ompared to other forms of crowdfunding and capital
raising, equity crowdfunding for the public has the worst 'bang for your buck'
in all of corporate finance.""0 3 Similarly, corporate finance practitioner Thomas
Murphy, a partner at McDermott, Will & Emery in Chicago, has commented
that the crowdfunding exemption "will be one of the most expensive ways
to raise money."0' As a result, he is skeptical "that crowdfunding is going to
be an efficient and viable funding mechanism for very many people."' Even
crowdfunding advocates admit that the cost-benefit assessment may be
a deterrent for potential participants or may dictate the way in which they
employ the crowdfunding exemption. 06
than support it.").
loo See Campbell, supra note 21, at 832 ("It was also clear from the beginning that the
mandatory provisions of the Act itself may make it difficult for the Commission to construct an
efficient regulatory crowdfunding regime for small businesses in search of external capital.").
1o It is significant to note that the SEC's proposed rule making under the CROWDFUND
Act makes some regulatory choices that mitigate these congressionally imposed costs, including
(for example) applying the 12-month aggregate offering limit only to offered securities actually
sold by the issuer and permitting accounting firms not registered with the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board to perform audits on issuers using the securities crowdfunding
exemption. See Crowdsfunding, Securities Act Release No. 9470, Exchange Act Release No. 70741,
78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, at 70-71, 77-78 (proposed Oct. 23, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
proposed/2013/33-947o.pdf
102 See, e.g., Andrew Ackerman & Angus Loten, SEC Moves Ahead with 'Crowdfunding'
Proposal, WALL STREET J., http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SBooo04240527023o 3 6i5304 5
79153463087785476 (last updated Oct. 23, 2013, 1o:35 PM); Korn, supra note 68; Dave Michaels,
Crowdfunding for Internet Stock Sales Approved by SEC, BLOOMBERG (Oct 24, 2013 I2:0I AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-IO-23/sec-to-vote-on-crowdfunding-plan-as-white-
advances-jobs-act-i-.html.
103 Korn, supra note 68.
104 Karol, supra note 68.
105 Id.
106 See, e.g., Neiss, supra note 23; Paul Spinrad, How the SEC Listened to the Crowd for
Crowdfunding Rules, PBS MEDIASHIFT (Dec. 4, 2013), http://www.pbs.org/mediashift/2013/I2/
how-the-sec-listened-to-the-crowd-for-crowdfunding-rules/. The strategies for use of the
exemption may vary from issuer to issuer, but all will involve an assessment of the amount of cost
associated with the benefit to be achieved.
If you are looking to raise money via crowdfunding, the moral of the story is, try to raise
as dose to the next threshold as possible. The thresholds are at sIoo,ooo, ssoo,ooo, and
siM. So if you need to raise s6o,ooo for your business, aim for s99,ooo. Not only will
you pay less for that money but you will have more of it. Of course, this assumes you will
be able to secure s99,ooo from backers. Same holds true for the sioo,oo to ssoo,ooo
levels and over s5oo,ooo level. While this was not the intent of the legislation (to force
companies to seek more capital than they need), it may make sense when trying to
decrease the cost of raising that money.
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Potential intermediaries also face significant costs, including the cost of
registration. These costs have neither been widely described and discussed nor
gone unnoticed. For example, a current crowdfunding entrepreneur, Kendall
Almerico, is concerned that complexity and costs will dissuade prospective
funding portals from entering the market."' He estimates that the cost of
entry will total "several hundred thousand dollars." 1 s Adding insult to injury,
the CROWDFUND Act limits the revenue-generating activities of funding
portals by providing that funding portals may not "offer investment advice or
recommendations.""o9 Accordingly, to cover their costs, intermediaries may
have to be creative about financing their operations-including by generating
a high volume of clients by discounting fees charged to initial and early clients
as a loss leader.
The SEC's rulemaking proposal acknowledges that the high cost of capital
for small business issuers is foundational to the CROWDFUND Act's purpose
(i.e., that an objective of the CROWDFUND Act is the avoidance of high
costs associated with registered offerings) and is a valid source of concern."'o
The proposal release is peppered with references to and questions about costs."'
The SEC's economic analysis in the proposal releasell 2 also, by necessity, raises
cost issues, and the SEC is honest about their origins: "While the costs and
benefits of the proposed rules in large part stem from the statutory mandate of
Title III, certain costs and benefits are affected by the discretion we propose to
exercise in connection with implementing this mandate.""'
Ultimately, however, the SEC's analysis of the costs and benefits of its
rulemaking under the crowdfunding exemption, like similar analyses of costs
and benefits offered by others (including those noted above), is necessarily
conjectural or inconclusive. At the outset of its analysis, the SEC notes that
the "costs and benefits are difficult to quantify or estimate with any degree of
certainty, especially considering that Section 4(a)(6) provides a new method
Neiss, supra note 23.
107 Karol, supra note 68.
108 Id.
109 SeeJOBS Act, Pub. L. No. uxz-io6, § 304(b), 126 Stat. 3o6,3I5 (codified at s U.S.C. § 78c(a)
(8o)(A) (2012)).
io See Crowdfunding, Securities Act Release No. 9470, Exchange Act Release No. 70741,
78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, at 344 (proposed Oct. 23, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
proposed/2013/33-9470.pdf ("The crowdfinding provisions of the JOBS Act were designed to
help provide startups and small businesses with capital by making relatively low dollar offerings of
securities less costly."); id. at 12 ("We are mindful of the costs imposed by, and the benefits to be
obtained from, our rules.").
i See, e.g., id. at 46,71,78, 8o, 85, 86, 94,105, io6, 144-45,146, i66, 167,189,258, 265, 268, 280.
12 The SEC's extensive, albeit necessarily incomplete and inexact, cost-benefit analysis in the
proposal release is driven by statutory and regulatory mandates as well as judicial review. See, e.g., i5
U.S.C. § 7 7b(b) (2012); id. § 78c(f) & § 78w(a)(2); Business Roundtable v. Sec's & Exch. Comm'n,
647 F.3d u44 (D.C. Cir. z0n).
13 Id. at 317.
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for raising capital in the United States."114 Although the SEC has estimated
the compliance costs attendant to each aspect of its rulemaking under the
CROWDFUND Act,"s the actual costs and realizable benefits of the
crowdfiinding exemption, as implemented through the SEC's rulemaking, will
depend on the number and nature of the issuers, investors, and intermediaries
that participate in investment crowdfunding-which are unknown at the
present time."' Consequently, the SEC's economic assessments are qualified by
use of words like "could," "might," and "would.""'
In the absence of data based on a pre-existing investment crowdfunding
market, the reactions of potential market participants may best indicate the
significance of the costs of compliance with the crowdfinding exemption.
Although the CROWDFUND Act seeks to democratize capital creation by
expanding the number and type of investors (as one part of the JOBS Act's
more general strategy of increasing capital formation through innovations to
public and private offering processes),"' market observers suggest that the
costs of participation in the crowdfunding exemption are driving eligible
issuers and intermediaries to the less costly, more efficient offering process
under Rule 506 of Regulation D found in the 1933 Act." 9 Ihe SEC modified
Rule 506 in accordance with the mandate provided in Title II of the JOBS Act
to allow for general solicitation of and advertising to and for an unlimited
number of non-accredited investors, even over the Internet, provided that all
sales are made to accredited investors (including, e.g., institutional investors,
high net-worth individuals, and others who are considered, under applicable
SEC rules in Regulation D, better able to bear the risk of loss of their entire
investment).12 0 This change has generated new and additional interest in the
use of Rule 506 (which has been the darling of the transactional exemptions
114 Id. at 345.
115 See id. at 353-421.
n16 See, e.g., id. at 345-53 (describing the overall economic effects of the crowdfunding
exemption).
117 See id.
n18 The JOBS Act is styled as legislation "[t]o increase American job creation and economic
growth by improving access to the public capital markets for emerging growth companies."JOBS
Act, Pub. L. No. ui2-io6, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (pmbl.); see Mark Landler, Obama Signs Bill to
Promote Start-Up Investments, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 6, 2012, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/20I2/o4/o6/us/politics/obama-signs-bill-to-ease-investing-in-start-ups.htm (describing
and quoting the President's remarks on the objectives of the JOBS Act and the CROWDFUND
Act at the JOBS Act signing ceremony).
119 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2014); see Bradford, supra note 25, at 222-23 (noting the advantages of
the Rule 5o6 amendments for issuers desiring to raise capital over the Internet); Hurt, supra note
21, at 44 ("[W]ith the lifting of the ban on general solicitation for Rule 5o6 private placements,
issuers may engage in 'accredited crowdfunding' without a registered portal, under that exemption
and not Section 4(6)."); id. at 58 ("[L]iberalization of other registration exemptions will channel
quality projects from 'retail crowdfunding' under Section 4(6) to 'accredited crowdfunding' under
Rule 5o6 of Regulation D.").
120 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230-501, 230.5 o6(b).
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from registration under the 1933 Act) among those who might also use the
crowdfiunding exemption. The SEC acknowledges the possibility that some
issuers may be able to avail themselves of other exemptions, including Rule 506
as amended by the JOBS Act.'21 In fact, both issuers and intermediaries may
find that a comparative cost-benefit analysis favors the use of Rule 506 over the
crowdfunding exemption or may, as one crowdfunding advocate has suggested,
determine it beneficial to adopt a strategy of conducting offerings under both
exemptions.12
Given the high cost associated with use of the crowdfunding exemption,
the increased interest in, and efficacy of, Rule 506 threatens to undercut the
ostensible capital-broadening purpose of the CROWDFUND Act. This risk
has generated discussion, criticism, and calls for change.
Policymakers should harmonize two sections of the JOBS Act that run the
risk ofbenefitting wealthy investors at the expense of the crowd. One portion
of the law permits mass marketing of less regulated private offerings so long
as sales are made to verified accredited investors. Another portion creates a
detailed framework for crowd investing, but includes a number of built-in
registration, education, investment cap, and disclosure requirements.
Because of lower anticipated regulatory burdens and costs, many investment
platforms have shifted attention to facilitating capital-raising from
accredited investors. It remains unclear to what extent entrepreneurs or
investment platforms will ultimately engage the crowd. Policymakers must
be careful not to create a two-tiered system whereby the wealthy investors
receive the best investment opportunities and the crowd is left with what
remains.'
A two-tiered system in which the general public-which includes
non-accredited investors-is left with unattractive investment options is
inconsistent with the spirit underlying the CROWDFUND Act. If, as I
contend, the costs of complying with the crowdfunding exemption shut
promising small businesses (both potential issuers and intermediaries) out of
the capital market or shift their preferences to private placement transactions
involving a limited, elite group of investors, then the CROWDFUND Act will
have failed in its mission and constitutes a waste of congressional and SEC
resources. Yet, there may be a way to leverage these sunk transaction costs to
achieve more of the objectives that motivated Congress's consideration and
adoption of the CROWDFUND Act.
121 Crowdfunding, Securities Act Release No. 9470, Exchange Act Release No. 70741,
78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, at 345-46 (proposed Oct. 23, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
proposed/2013/33-9470.pdf.
122 See Neiss, supra note 23 (proposing a strategy for maximizing aggregate offering amounts
and limiting capital raising costs through use of both the crowdfusnding exemption and a private
placement using general solicitation under Rule 5o6(c) of the 1933 Act); see also Hurt, supra note
21, at 51 ("Commentators predict that accredited crowdfunding under Rule 5o6 will eclipse retail
crowdfunding and make the latter merely a back-up plan for hard-to-fund issuers.").




III. WHAT WE CAN Do Now To RESCUE INVESTMENT CROWDFUNDING
The federal system of securities regulation-a system designed to
encourage capital formation through investor protection and market integrity
maintenance fashioned by mandatory disclosure, fraud and other liability,
and substantive regulation of participants and their conduct-is a puzzle.
Solving the puzzle to support and encourage any individual desired securities
offering market requires that regulators effectively balance the costs and
benefits to the core players in the market-the three I's: issuers, investors, and
intermediaries-to best ensure that each is incentivized to participate. The
perceived costs of the crowdfunding exemption to issuers and intermediaries
are high enough to raise significant concerns among prospective issuers and
intermediaries about whether the benefits are sufficient to support their
involvement. Benefits and costs to investors may not be perfectly well balanced,
but they are less skewed against participation.
The investment crowdfunding disincentives for issuers and investors are
particularly strong and apt in the case of low dollar-value offerings (in which
the aggregate pecuniary benefits are limited) for small businesses at early stages
of development.124 This is unfortunate, since small, early-stage businesses
conducting limited dollar-value offerings may be most likely to need the new
"friends"that crowdfunding could-provide.125 They have tapped out their friends
and family but are not yet (or may never be) ripe for new investor, late-stage
seed, angel, or venture capital infusions. This type of entity or business project
was the type of issuer that was innovatively using investment crowdfunding
before the adoption of the JOBS Act (i.e., until light was cast on the need to
register offers and sales of the investment interests being offered).'26 Although
the SEC has expressed doubts that there would be much crossover between
crowdfunded offerings in which securities are not offered or sold and those
in which investment crowdfunding is conducted, the unregulated market
that pre-existed the CROWDFUND Act indicates that there is some
interest in the crowdfunding of unequity-which does constitute investment
crowdfunding-by, and in a manner similar to that used by, issuers seeking
funding through crowdfunding that does not involve the offer or sale of a
security.127
Commentators have begun to call on Congress to take action to rescue
the crowdfunding exemption by, among other things, reducing the associated
124 See Campbell, supra note 21, at 836 ("The Commission in its first iteration of its
crowdfunding regulations has failed to appreciate the impact on small issuers of the relative offering
costs generated by the crowdfunding disclosure obligations.").
125 See id. ("Especially adversely impacted . . . will be offerings by small business with small
external capital needs, which seems exactly counter to the whole purpose of the JOBS Act.").
126 See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
127 See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
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costs. "In order for equity crowdfunding to the public to serve as a useful tool,
as intended," one observer wrote, "Congress needs to amend the JOBS Act
to make it less onerous and costly."' 28 Another simply offered, "I think the
Congress should start over. "129 Rep. Patrick McHenry has introduced a bill
in Congress that would essentially do just that: it supplants Title III of the
JOBS Act and replaces it with a simpler, more efficient, registration exemption
regime for investment crowdfunding.130
I do not favor additional congressional action to alter the cost structure
of the CROWDFUND Act as a means of affording relief to small private
issuers desiring to make limited offerings over the Internet. Congress is not
well equipped as a representative, diverse, highly political, non-expertized,
legislative body to engage in the nuanced balancing of costs and benefits in
the emergent crowdfunding market.'This task is much more in the rulemaking
wheelhouse of the SEC as an appointed, relatively nimble, less political, expert
regulator."'
As a result, I suggest that the SEC return to the task of regulating
crowdfunding to better address unmet and underserved needs in the market
for small business capital. In my original coauthored paper on crowdfunding,
my coauthor and I advocated a process by which the SEC could approach that
work and outlined the possible substantive elements of resulting regulation.13 2
At the risk of inviting accusations that I am a one-trick pony or that I continue
to incessantly beat a single drum, I urge the SEC to return to that process and
those elements and propose an exemption from registration that employs a
lower level of regulation and cost while correspondingly reducing investor risk.
A number of productive ideas could ensue.'Ihe ultimate regulatory outcome
of that process could be, for instance, a new federal registration exemption
featuring significantly lower per-unit and aggregate investor caps-a rule that
limits investor risk by decreasing investor exposure to financial harm. With a
rule of that kind, there should be fewer concerns the need for significant investor
protection devices (e.g., detailed mandatory disclosures and enhanced liability
provisions). Alternatively, engagement with the suggested rulemaking process
could result in the SEC determining that unequity' 0 should be re-classified as
an instrument that is exempt from the definition of a security, ceding regulatory
control of unequity transactions to consumer protection regulation.
128 Korn, supra note 68.
129 William Carleton, 2he JOBS Act. A Better Way to Regulate Equity Crowdfunding,
VCEXPERTs, https://vcexperts.com/buzz articles/1303 (last visited Apr. 6, 2014).
130 See Equity Crowdfunding Improvement Act of 2014, H.R. 4564, I 3th Congress (2014),
available at https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/i3/hr4564/text.
131 Cf Cohn, supra note 26, at 1445 (indicating that the SEC may have been best positioned,
but unlikely, to balance the competing interests at stake in constructing an efficacious 1933 Act
registration exemption for crowdfunding).
132 See Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 5, at 937-61.
133 See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
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The SEC's task now must also take into account the CROWDFUND Act
and the final form of its implementing rules. This should make its task easier
(and make its participation more likely). In other words, this Article suggests
that the SEC should regulate in the void left after full implementation of the
CROWDFUND Act's registration exemption (which, at the time this Article
was written, had not yet occurred) to establish a prudent, realizable regulatory
exemption from 1933 Act registration for small crowdfunded offerings.
CONCLUSION
Among other things, the CROWDFUND Act in particular and the JOBS
Act more generally respond to a natural expansion of private offerings beyond
face-to-face and other directed communications between and among repeat
players.
Market demand, the Internet, and new modes of communication are driving
significant changes in capital markets.These changes put increasing pressure
on federal and state policymakers to ensure that laws are not unnecessarily
impeding the fair and efficient flow of capital. The 2012 JOBS Act was an
important first step in recognizing these shifting dynamics, but more needs
to be done to enhance capital access for businesses rangng from startups to
more mature companies ready for the public markets.'
Specifically, apropos of the theme of the symposium for which this Article
was researched and written ("The Securities Act of 1933 at 80: Does It
Provide a Fair and Efficient Access to Capital?"),"'s investment crowdfunding
under the CROWDFUND Act is neither fair nor efficient. In its current
form, the CROWDFUND Act provides, at best, a deep-discount,
limited-use registration exemption under the 1933 Act. In its effort to
deregulate investment crowdfunding, the CROVDFUND Act introduces
new regulation and attendant costs to a magnitude and in a manner likely to
drive many, if not most, small businesses to other capital formation methods."6
However, hope (as they say) springs eternal. With the thought that all is not
yet lost, this essay proposes (actually, re-proposes) an approach to a workable
1933 Act registration exemption for crowdfunded limited offerings. There are
possible ways forward; but navigating these paths to a more fair and efficient
system of investment crowdfunding will not be easy. They require abundant
patience, sufficient skill, and ample political will, any or all of which may be
134 Gorfine, supra note 123.
135 Symposium, The Securities Act of 933 at 8o: Does It Provide a Fair and Eficient Access to
Capital?, 102 Ky. L.J. 815 (2014), available at http://www.law.uky.edulindex.php?pid= 473.
136 See Campbell, supra note 21, at 848 ("Without significant changes, the crowdfunding will
be less available for small business issuers than efficiency would require"); Hurt, supra note 21,
at 46-48 (describing why "Equity Crowdfunding is Doomed Because Section 4(6) is Too Costly
and Burdensome on Issuers and Portals"); id. at 59 ("Though crowdfiinding has the promise of .
. . democratizing both access to capital and access to investment opportunities, a shift from retail
crowdfunding to accredited crowdfunding will not fulfill that promise.").
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lacking in the near or foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the ideas shared are
designed to provide the basis for, at a minimum, further constructive discussion
about the desire for capital market expansion evidenced in the JOBS Act.

